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QUINEAN UPDATES: IN DEFENSE OF TWO DOGMAS* 
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we 
make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the sys-
tem. Even a statement very close to the periphery can 
be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by 
pleading hallucination or by amending certain state-
ments of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by 
the same token, no statement is immune to revision.1 
According to tradition, some knowledge is “absolutely independent of experience.” This 
knowledge is a priori, standing opposed to “empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible 
only a posteriori, that is, through experience.”2 Traditionalists hold that understanding a state-
ment in this privileged class can provide justification, sufficient for knowledge. One can deduce a 
truth in this privileged class from premises that issue solely from understanding. Canonical ex-
amples of a priori knowable truths include:3 
Logical Truths: ‘everything is self-identical’; ‘all dogs are dogs’; ‘either it’s raining or it’s not 
raining’; 
Mathematical Truths: ‘7+5=12’; ‘every number has a successor’; ‘the interior angles of a trian-
gle add to 180°’; and, 
Definitional Truths: ‘all triangles have three angles’; ‘all bachelors are unmarried’. 
Some of these statements require experience to understand.4 Perhaps, one needs spatial experi-
ence to know what a triangle is. But the knowledge that all triangles have three angles is still pur-
                                                 
* We are grateful for comments and suggestions to the following people: David Chalmers, Gary Kemp, Brian 
Rabern, Adam Riever, Anders Schoubye, Thomas Sattig, Allan Weir and the audiences at a conference on Quine at 
the University of Glasgow and at the Institute of Philosophy in London as well as the research colloquium at the 
University of Tübingen and a workshop with David Chalmers in Konstanz. Special thanks are due to Kajetan Dvo-
racek, who helped greatly in creating a Word-version of this paper. Moreover, we would like to thank an anonymous 
referee of this journal for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. One author profited from generous 
funds of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant number SCHU 3080/3-1) when doing research related to this 
paper. 
1 W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 20–46, at p. 43. 
2 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (London: Macmillan, 1929), B2–3. 
3 For neutrality, we say that sentences express “claims” or “statements,” which are the objects of epistemic states. 
Our main target, Chalmers, treats sentences themselves as the objects of epistemic states. 
4 Kant says some a priori knowledge is pure, requiring only concepts obtainable a priori, while other a priori 
knowledge is impure, requiring experience to acquire understanding. 
  
portedly a priori, since it can be known without empirical evidence. The experience enables one 
to entertain the claim, it does not justify it. 
Since a priori claims are supposedly justified just by understanding them, the traditionalist says 
that the justification is insensitive to the particular experiences of the knower. Anyone who un-
derstands the meaning of ‘triangle’ has justification to believe that all triangles have three angles. 
So, on this traditional conception, a priori knowledge is a kind of epistemic necessity. Experience 
rules out epistemic possibilities. But a priori truths hold regardless of the information provided by 
experience; they hold in any epistemic possibility. They are “confirmed no matter what.”5 As a 
result, a priori truths are empirically indefeasible on this traditional conception.6 There is no em-
pirical evidence that could rationally undermine one’s justification to believe in them. 
Yet, the traditional conception of the a priori and many of its applications were cast into doubt 
by a series of challenges raised by Quine.7 Quine’s most compelling argument appealed to exam-
ples from the history of science to make two points: that every claim may be held true come what 
may and that every claim is susceptible to empirical revision. To say that a claim may be held 
true come what may means that for any claim 𝑆, it is possible for an agent to continue to rational-
ly endorse 𝑆 regardless of the agent’s incoming experience. If every claim can be held true come 
what may, then every claim will be a priori on the traditional conception. On the other hand, if 
every claim can be rationally revised in light of empirical evidence, then there are no a priori 
truths, since no claim is epistemically necessary. Some have reacted to these Quinean arguments 
by abandoning the assumption that there are any epistemically necessary claims. They hold that 
the justification for any claim can be defeated by empirical evidence.8 This leaves space for 
claims that are a priori in some minimal sense. Specifically, these claims have a certain degree of 
pro tanto justification arising just from understanding. But, this justification can be overwhelmed 
by contrary evidence issuing from experience. So whether an agent is overall justified in believ-
ing the claim will depend on her particular experiential state. 
                                                 
5 Hilary Putnam, “‘Two Dogmas’ Revisited,” in Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Vol-
ume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 87–97, at p. 87. 
6 Even proponents of defeasibility concede that this describes one traditional view of the a priori which draws “in-
spiration from Kant’s characterization of a priori knowledge as independent of all experience.” Albert Casullo, A 
Priori Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 32. For a recent defense, see Hartry Field, “Apriority 
as an Evaluative Notion,” in Hartry Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). 
7 W. V. O. Quine, “Truth by Convention,” in W. V. O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 77–106; Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” op. cit. and 
W. V. O. Quine, “Carnap and Logical Truth,” Synthese, XII, 4 (December 1960): 350–74. 
8 The issue is extensively discussed in Casullo, A Priori Justification, op. cit. See C. S. Jenkins, “A Priori 
Knowledge: Debates and Developments,” Philosophy Compass, III, 3 (May 2008): 436–50, §1, for a recent synopsis. 
  
We explore a different reaction which seeks to preserve the traditional conception for some 
core cases of a priori knowledge. For instance, Chalmers says, 
On a common traditional conception, at least some a priori justification (and some justification for 
believing analytic truths) is indefeasible. One reasonably might hold that some a priori justification 
(in logic or mathematics, say) yields not just knowledge but certainty, at least on ideal reflection.9 
This position requires meeting Quine’s argument head on. It requires arguing that some claims 
may not be held true come what may and that some a priori justified claims cannot be revised in 
light of experience. 
Chalmers does just that.10 He defends rational constraints on belief revision and argues that 
these falsify both Quinean claims. Specifically, Chalmers argues that belief revision is irrational 
if it violates the Bayesian principle of conditionalization: a rational agent’s credence in 𝑆 after 
acquiring evidence 𝐸 must be equal to her conditional credence in 𝑆 given 𝐸 prior to acquiring 𝐸. 
Chalmers appeals to this principle to argue (1) that not every claim may be held true come what 
may and (2) that some claims are unrevisable in light of empirical evidence. It would follow that 
Bayesianism conflicts with Quinean empiricism. This is surprising given that Bayesianism re-
quires a kind of holism about justification resembling Quine’s.11 
By carefully examining Quine’s argument, we show that Chalmers’s criticism misfires. First, 
we show that adopting Bayesianism actually reinforces the conclusion that a rational agent may 
hold true any statement come what may. We then find some auxiliary premises in Chalmers’s 
text meant to show that there are claims that cannot be held true come what may. We argue that 
these auxiliary premises do not threaten Quine’s claim when it is rightly understood. 
Next, we turn to Chalmers’s specific example of a statement that is purportedly immune to 
empirical revision. This statement is a material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. The antecedent 𝐷 is meant to 
be a complete description of the world expressed in a privileged vocabulary. The consequent 𝑆 is 
some ordinary claim such as ‘water is H2O’ made outside of the privileged vocabulary. Chalmers 
thinks that since the antecedent contains all of the empirical information about a world, there is 
no empirical evidence that can lower one’s credence in the whole conditional. The information 
                                                 
9 David J. Chalmers, “Revisability and Conceptual Change in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’,” this JOURNAL, 
CVIII, 8 (August 2011): 387–415, at pp. 389–90. 
10 In Chalmers, “Revisability and Conceptual Change,” op. cit.; and David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
11 Chalmers’s arguments are partially in the service of defending against objections to his conception of analytici-
ty. Even if Chalmers’s response to Quine fails for the reasons discussed in this paper, this does not show that his 
account of analyticity falls to the Quinean objections. 
  
has been “frontloaded” into the antecedent of the conditional. We sort through various notions of 
empirical revisability that can be reconstructed in the Bayesian framework. We then propose that 
the prospects for empirical revision are more promising than Chalmers suggests. Previous re-
sponses such as Ebbs (2014) implicitly concede that holding true or revisability require violations 
of conditionalization.12 On both points, we directly challenge Chalmers’s claim that Quine’s the-
ses require violations of conditionalization. 
In §1, we frame the debate by excluding some prima facie conflicts between Bayesianism and 
Quinean holism. Specifically, we will set aside logical truths and evidence sentences both of 
which are assigned the highest possible credence by Bayesians. In §2, we discuss and reject 
Chalmers’s argument that not every claim may be held true come what may. Indeed, we will ar-
gue that Bayesianism actually supports the opposite conclusion. In §§3-4, we develop Chalmers’s 
argument that certain “frontloaded” material conditionals are unrevisable. In §4, we show that the 
argument is compatible with a minimal conception of revisability. In §5, we go beyond this min-
imal conception to explore the prospects of more substantive empirical revisability. 
I.  LOGIC, EVIDENCE, AND THE A PRIORI 
We begin with some preparatory work to fit Quine’s theses into the Bayesian framework. Quine’s 
usual formulations involve only two attitudes an agent may have towards a claim: endorsement 
and rejection. The Bayesian framework posits a great deal of additional structure in the agent’s 
credal states. Rather than belief and rejection, the framework posits that each agent 𝐴 has a cre-
dence distribution 𝑐𝐴(… ), a function that assigns a number between 0 and 1 to each claim. As-
signments of 0 and 1 represent, respectively, rejection and acceptance with certainty.13 Intermedi-
ate assignments represent intermediate attitudes. 
Standard Bayesian models make assumptions about logic and about evidence that sit ill with 
Quine’s theses. 
                                                 
12 Gary Ebbs, “Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma,” this JOURNAL, CXI, 
12 (December 2014): 689–703. 
13 For some challenges see Alan Hájek, “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be,” Synthese, CXXXVII, 3 (De-
cember 2003): 273–323; Isaac Levi, The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Isaac Levi, “Truth, Fallibility, and the Growth of Knowledge,” in 
Isaac Levi, Decisions and Revisions: Philosophical Essays on Knowledge and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2006), pp. 109–27; and Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
  
Logical truths and falsehoods: In classical Bayesian epistemology, logical truths are assigned 
credence 1 and logical falsehoods are assigned credence 0.14 
Evidence sentences: In classical Bayesian epistemology, evidence sentences are assigned cre-
dence 1. Sentences which entail the falsehood of evidence sentences are assigned credence 0.15 
These assumptions are problematic because credence 1 and 0 correspond to acceptance and re-
jection with certainty in the Bayesian framework in the following sense. If a statement 𝑝 has cre-
dence 1, then conditionalizing on any evidence 𝐸 does not lower one’s credence in 𝑝. Statements 
assigned credence 1 are therefore immune to revision in the Bayesian framework. Similarly, if 𝑝 
is assigned credence 0, then there is no evidence 𝐸 such that updating with 𝐸 can raise one’s cre-
dence in 𝑝. In these respects, the assignment of credence 1 or credence 0 to a statement can be 
said to be persistent under conditionalization.16 
If Quine holds that any claim whatsoever can be held true come what may or can be revised in 
light of empirical evidence, then the Bayesian treatment of logical falsehoods and logical truths is 
problematic. Since they are assigned credence 0, there is no way in the standard Bayesian frame-
work to hold logical falsehoods true in the first place. Thus, they cannot be held-true-come-what-
may. Similarly, there is no evidence that can lower one’s credence in a logical truth. So, logical 
truths cannot be revised in the standard Bayesian framework. 
We spot the certainty of logical truths and the certain falsity of logical falsehoods to Quine’s 
opponent. This is not because we want to endorse the thesis that logical truths are unrevisable, 
but because it is difficult to discuss the Bayesian framework without introducing the assumption. 
In our view, the fact that an agent must assign the same credence to all logical truths should be 
seen as a limitation of the Bayesian framework, just as the identification of the propositions ex-
pressed by logically true sentences is seen as a limitation of the possible worlds framework for 
propositions. That this is a limitation does not mean that the Bayesian framework is inaccurate or 
inappropriate for modeling belief revision.17 Nonetheless, our discussion will not push the limits 
                                                 
14 This is because a credence function is defined as a classical probability function, which is defined so that the 
probability of a logical truth is 1. 
15 This is because the rational credence in 𝑝 in response to acquiring evidence 𝐸 is modeled as the prior condition-
al credence in 𝑝, given 𝐸. But 𝑐𝑟(𝐸|𝐸) = 1. 
16 See related discussion in Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, op. cit., §10.2–10.6. 
17 For instance, Mark Norris Lance, “Subjective Probability and Acceptance,” Philosophical Studies, LXXVII, 1 
(January 1995): 147–79, and Michael G. Titelbaum, “The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs,” Philosophical Re-
view, CXVII, 4 (October 2008): 555–606, at p. 558, footnote 3, appeal to holistic considerations to argue that the 
framework best models rationality in agents where certain empirical propositions are accepted as holding. But ac-
  
of the Bayesian picture in this way. One reason for this is that Chalmers himself attempts to show 
that there are non-logical truths that cannot be held true come what may and also that there are 
non-logical claims that are unrevisable. This would be a much stronger anti-Quinean result than 
could be established merely by appealing to the controversial status of logical truths in the Bayes-
ian framework. Indeed, Chalmers simply presupposes certainty in logical truths as a background 
constraint on ideal reasoning. Consequently, we restrict our attention to non-logical truths: we 
investigate whether any 𝑆 not expressed by a logical truth may be held true come what may and 
whether any statement 𝑆 not expressed by a logical truth is defeasible in light of new experi-
ence.18 
The Bayesian treatment of evidence sentences also calls for comment. Quine thinks of evi-
dence as constituted by experiences, particular events at the periphery of the human body. For 
this reason, Quine thinks that an evidence, or observation, sentence may be revised if it conflicts 
with the rest of our theory. 
[S]urely an observation is evidence for the sentence that reports that very observation, and against 
the sentence that predicated the contrary. Our legalist can stand his ground even here, pointing out 
that in an extreme case, where beliefs that have been supported overwhelmingly from time immemo-
rial are suddenly challenged by a single contrary observation, the observation will be dismissed as an 
illusion.19 
If the observation sentences are treated as evidence, then the Bayesian framework will assign 
them credence 1. They will therefore be unrevisable. This issue has been discussed extensively, 
but it raises different issues from what is discussed here.20 For this reason, we concede that evi-
dence claims are assigned credence 1 and that claims that are incompatible with a claim in evi-
dence are assigned credence 0. Thus, claims in evidence and their logical entailments are treated 
as unrevisable. 
                                                                                                                                                              
cepting such a framework leaves open the possibility that these background empirical propositions could themselves 
be revised outside of the Bayesian framework. 
18 Another reason is that Quine himself sometimes expresses doubts about the revisability of logical truth: “Any 
purely logical truth is thus exempted [from revision], since it adds nothing to what S would logically imply anyway; 
and sundry irrelevant sentences in S will be exempted as well.” W. V. O. Quine, Pursuit of Truth: Revised Edition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 14. 
19 W. V. O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 5–6. 
20 See, for instance, Jonathan Weisberg, “Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers,” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, LX, 4 (December 2009): 793–812; and Jonathan Weisberg, “Updating, Un-
dermining, and Independence,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, LXVI, 1 (March 2015): 125–59. 
  
II.  HOLDING TRUE 
The thesis that one may retain a belief “come what may” follows from Quine’s holism about jus-
tification. Holism says that individual claims are not directly confirmed or disconfirmed by expe-
rience. Rather, experience immediately confirms or disconfirms only a whole theory. 
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from 
its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion […] is that our 
statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as 
a corporate body.21 
In seeking to disprove the claim that the Earth is flat, for instance, one might attempt to circum-
navigate it by traveling along a path without turning until one arrives at a position resembling 
one’s starting location in exact detail. But any experiment of this sort will disconfirm the flatness 
of the Earth only in the context of auxiliary assumptions: that the failure to turn guarantees that 
one travels on the straightest path on the Earth’s surface or that there are not two exactly resem-
bling locations on the Earth. The experiment immediately refutes—at best—the conjunction of 
these hypotheses together with other background hypotheses. The thesis that one may hold a 
claim true come what may emerges from the fact that the denial of a conjunction is logically con-
sistent with the truth of each conjunct.22 Suppose a scientist has attempted to circumnavigate the 
Earth and finds herself, after a year, in a city nearly indiscernible from her origin. Reports say 
someone resembling her left one year ago. This scientist remains logically consistent if she re-
tains the thesis that the Earth is flat, but comes to believe that she has arrived at a new city indis-
cernible from the one she left from which another traveler set out a year ago. Indeed, agents with 
different background beliefs find one of these claims more plausible to reject. Actual agents find 
it more plausible to reject the flatness of the Earth. Other agents may have reasons to expect 
symmetry on the Earth’s surface. They may find the experience as yet more confirmation that 
different areas of the world are symmetric, rather than that the Earth is not flat. 
Quine’s thesis that one may hold any statement true come what may—call this belief-retention-
come-what-may—is a possibility claim. It entails that for any evidence 𝐸 and statement 𝑆, it is 
possible for there to be an agent who holds true a statement 𝑆 despite having evidence 𝐸.23 But 
                                                 
21 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” op. cit., p. 41. 
22 This assumes, of course, that neither conjunct implies the conjunction. 
23 We therefore read the claim as an existential claim: there exists a possible agent who endorses 𝑆 after acquiring 
evidence 𝐸. But this point has been missed. For example, Ebbs, “Conditionalization and Conceptual Change,” 
op. cit., p. 692, principle (1′), reformulates Chalmers’s argument against holding-true as a challenge to revisability. 
  
belief-retention-come-what-may says more than that it is merely possible for one to endorse 𝑆 
after confronting evidence 𝐸. Such a thesis would not threaten the traditional conception of the a 
priori. Rather Quine must show that it is possible for an agent to rationally endorse 𝑆 despite hav-
ing evidence 𝐸. As Chalmers says, 
It is unremarkable that irrational subjects might hold onto any sentence or reject any sentence, and 
this observation has no consequences regarding analyticity or a priority. For Quine’s observations 
about revisability and holding-true to have any bite, rational subjects are required.24 
The discussion above, however, appealed only to the fact that it is logically consistent to main-
tain any individual thesis in a theory which has been disconfirmed by experience. This does not 
entail that it is rational to do so. 
Chalmers offers an argument purporting to show that it is not possible for a rational agent to 
continue to endorse any claim “come what may.” Chalmers argues by identifying additional con-
straints on rationality so that for every statement 𝑆 there is some evidence 𝐸 such that it is not 
possible for a rational agent to endorse 𝑆 while having evidence 𝐸. Specifically, Chalmers argues 
that a Bayesian account of belief change undermines the possibility of rationally holding true any 
claim come what may. In Chalmers’s preferred formulation, the principle says: 
(CS) If a subject is fully rational, and if the subject acquires total evidence specified by 𝐸 be-
tween 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, and if the content of the sentence 𝑆 does not change between 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, then 
𝑐𝑟2(𝑆) = 𝑐𝑟1(𝑆|𝐸).
25 
Here 𝑐𝑟2(𝑆) is the agent’s credence in 𝑆 at 𝑡2, and 𝑐𝑟1(𝑆|𝐸) is her conditional credence in 𝑆 
given 𝐸 at 𝑡1. The objects of credences are sentences in Chalmers’s statement of (CS), which is 
why he includes the possibility that 𝑆 changes content between 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. If continuing to hold 
true a sentence 𝑆 in light of evidence 𝐸 requires that 𝑆 changes meaning, then Quine’s observa-
tion has no obvious consequences for the traditional conception of the a priori. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Ebbs initially characterizes the target thesis as logically equivalent to an existential claim: he requires that for any 
agent 𝐴 who has a target credence in 𝑆, either 𝐴 or some other agent 𝐵 have a different credence in 𝑆 after updating 
with 𝐸. However, when he attempts to work this formulation into Chalmers’s argument, Ebbs drops the qualification 
that some other agent 𝐵 may have the target credence. Ibid., p. 693, principle (𝑃2). This is important, because keep-
ing that qualification in place makes Chalmers’s argument invalid on Ebbs’s formulation. 
24 Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., p. 213. 
25 Ibid. 
  
Chalmers argues that the principle of conditionalization undermines the view that for any claim 
𝑆 and evidence 𝐸, it is possible for a rational agent to endorse 𝑆 despite having evidence 𝐸, since 
“Quinean holding-true come what may requires widespread violation of conditionalization, which 
requires irrationality or conceptual change” on the part of the agent.26 
Chalmers considers a subject who holds true a sentence such as ‘all bachelors are untidy’ de-
spite the contrary evidence that there are tidy, eligible, unmarried men of a certain age. The sub-
ject accommodates this evidence by suitably adjusting her overall credences so that she comes to 
doubt the claim that all and only bachelors are eligible, unmarried men of that age. 
[S]uppose that at 𝑡1, Fred asserts ‘All bachelors are untidy’. At 𝑡2, Fred acquires evidence indicating 
that there is a tidy, unmarried 25-year-old man, and responds by denying that the man is a bachelor, 
as bachelors must be over 30. 
Let 𝐵 be ‘All bachelors are untidy’, and let 𝐸 be Fred’s total relevant evidence acquired between 𝑡1 
and 𝑡2. Let 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵) stand for Fred’s credence in 𝐵 at 𝑡1, and 𝑐𝑟2(𝐵) stand for Fred’s credence in 𝐵 at 
𝑡2. Then 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵) and 𝑐𝑟2(𝐵) are both high. 
The crucial question is: What is 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵|𝐸), Fred’s conditional credence in 𝐵 given 𝐸 at 𝑡1, before 
Fred acquires the evidence in question?27 
If Fred’s conditional credence 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵|𝐸) is low, then Fred violates the principle of conditionali-
zation: Fred had a low conditional credence in 𝐵 given 𝐸, but upon acquiring evidence 𝐸, he has 
a high credence in 𝐵. This is exactly the possibility that the principle of conditionalization fore-
closes. It follows that either Fred is irrational or that 𝐵 has changed meaning. Neither solution 
secures the result that a rational subject may retain a belief come what may. So the crucial ques-
tion is whether Fred’s conditional credence 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵|𝐸) can be high. 
We argue that there is no impediment issuing from Bayesianism to 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵|𝐸) being high. There 
is, therefore, no conflict between holding-true and Bayesianism. We then identify an additional 
constraint on rationality in Chalmers’s text which is actually operative in his argument against 
belief-retention-come-what-may. We argue that this constraint does not undermine belief-
retention-come-what-may, if it is rightly understood as a possibility claim. Once the logical form 
of the Quinean thesis is properly articulated, Chalmers’s argument dissolves. 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 214. 
27 Ibid., p. 212. 
  
II.1. Why Conditionalization Is Compatible with Holding-True. The principle of conditionali-
zation does not rule out the possibility that Fred’s conditional credence 𝑐𝑟1(𝐵|𝐸) is high. Quine’s 
thesis is that an agent may continue to endorse 𝑆 in spite of evidence 𝐸 if she retracts her en-
dorsement of some auxiliary assumption 𝑆∗. One reason for this is that 𝐸 only logically conflicts 
with 𝑆 given the presence of the auxiliary assumption 𝑆∗ in the theory. Given that the Bayesian 
framework speaks not only of endorsement and rejection but also of an agent’s credal distribu-
tion, it posits additional structure in the agent’s credal states. 
This additional structure actually supports the thesis of belief-retention-come-what-may, since 
it posits more parameters of freedom that can be revised to preserve the belief in question. That 
is, given an apparent conflict between a claim 𝑆 and some evidence 𝐸, an agent doesn’t actually 
need to revise her outright belief in any other sentence 𝑆∗ to resolve the conflict. Rather, she can 
also reassign her credences and conditional credences so that updating with 𝐸 fails to lower cre-
dence in 𝑆. To put this another way, the fact that claim 𝑆 conflicts with evidence 𝐸 for some ra-
tional agent 𝐴—equivalently, 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is low—does not entail that 𝑆 conflicts with 𝐸 for all ra-
tional agents 𝐴∗. For 𝐴∗ may simply assign different levels of credence (and conditional cre-
dence) to the totality of her background beliefs so that 𝑐𝑟𝐴∗(𝑆|𝐸) is high. In other words, 𝐴 and 
𝐴∗ may assign different prior probabilities to 𝑆 and 𝐸. So in the case at hand, there is no contra-
diction in Chalmers’s character Fred assigning a high prior conditional credence to the claim that 
bachelors are untidy given evidence 𝐸. 
Not only is this assignment consistent, but it is in line with a popular position among Bayesi-
ans, subjectivism, according to which there are no rational constraints on prior credences other 
than that logical truths be assigned credence 1 and logical falsehoods assigned credence 0. In-
deed, Chalmers is cognizant of this fact: “A common strand in Bayesian thinking, radical subjec-
tivism, denies that there are any such constraints on ultimate priors […].”28 It follows that there is 
nothing inherent in the principle of conditionalization that rules out belief-retention-come-what-
may. 
                                                 
28 Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., p. 165. 
  
II.2. Chalmers’s Additional Premise. So if there is a problem with the thesis that one may hold 
any claim true come what may, it must issue from a constraint on rationality beyond the principle 
of conditionalization. Chalmers elsewhere suggests that there are rational constraints on prior 
probabilities.29 Chalmers therefore seeks to articulate how these constraints prohibit belief-
retention-come-what-may. Chalmers asks, 
[I]s it true that a subject can hold on to any given sentence 𝑆 come what may, in light of any evi-
dence, without irrationality or conceptual change? By this analysis, this claim requires that for any 
given sentence 𝑆 and any evidence 𝐸, 𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐸) is high (or at least is not low).30 
In order for it to be possible for an agent to rationally believe-come-what-may a claim 𝑆, it 
must be possible for there to be an agent with antecedently high credence in 𝑆 given 𝐸, for any 
evidence 𝐸. It is this possibility which Chalmers seeks to rule out. 
Chalmers’s additional constraint on rationality—along with its importance to his argument—is 
only briefly stated. He considers the claim that for any sentence 𝑆, a rational subject can endorse 
it come what may. Chalmers says: 
But this claim is obviously false. For rational subjects and most sentences 𝑆, there will be evidence 
sentences 𝐸 such that 𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐸) is low. So if these subjects conditionalize, they will not be able to 
hold onto S come what may.31 
Chalmers’s core argument against belief-retention-come-what-may rests on this passage. 
Unfortunately, Chalmers’s statement is unclear. To show this, we revisit what it means to say 
that an agent may hold true a claim come what may. Once again, that one may hold-a-claim-true-
come-what-may is a possibility claim. So it must concern the possible existence of a rational 
agent who holds a claim true despite acquiring particular pieces of evidence. But Chalmers’s 
characterization suppresses any reference to an agent. We have three options for recovering the 
existential quantification over agents: 
HOLDING-TRUE1: There could be a rational agent 𝐴 such that for any claim 𝑆, and for any evi-
dence 𝐸 compatible with 𝑆, 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is high (or at least not low).
32 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Chalmers, “Revisability and Conceptual Change,” op. cit., p. 402. See also Chalmers, Constructing the World, 
op. cit., p. 213. 
31 Chalmers, “Revisability and Conceptual Change,” op. cit., p. 402. See also Chalmers, Constructing the World, 
op. cit., p. 214. 
  
HOLDING-TRUE2: For any claim 𝑆, there could be a rational agent 𝐴, such that for any evidence 
𝐸 compatible with 𝑆, 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is high (or at least not low). 
HOLDING-TRUE3: For any claim 𝑆, for any evidence 𝐸 compatible with 𝑆, there could be a ra-
tional agent 𝐴 such that 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is high (or at least not low). 
HOLDING-TRUE1 is the strongest form of this claim. It says that some rational agent has a high 
credence in any claim conditional on any evidence. This is obviously absurd. Given that having 
high conditional credences has implications for one’s absolute credences, it requires the existence 
of a rational agent to endorse every claim—even claims that contradict one another—given any 
information. Surely, this is not what Quine had in mind! 
In rejecting HOLDING-TRUE1, we are retreating from the strongest possible reading of Quine’s 
principle that any statement may be held true come what may. Though there are undoubtedly 
some formulations in Quine that are suggestive of this stronger requirement, many of the formu-
lations in Two Dogmas require only the weaker claims HOLDING-TRUE2 and HOLDING-TRUE3. 
For instance, observe that Quine’s formulation of the doctrine pertains to the statement itself, not 
to the agents: any statement may be held true come what may. Moreover, Quine’s reason for this 
claim is agent neutral: rather than reject a controversial claim, “[a] recalcitrant experience can 
[…] be accommodated by any of various alternative reëvaluations in various alternative quarters 
of the total system.”33 Notice that Quine does not say that any recalcitrant experience can be held 
true by any agent. Indeed, Quine observes that that we ourselves would have natural tendency to 
reject some claims and not others. 
[…] in the cases which we are now imagining, our natural tendency to disturb the total system as lit-
tle as possible would lead us to focus our revisions upon these specific statements concerning brick 
houses or centaurs.34  
So as we read Quine, he is not saying that we ourselves may hold true any claim come any evi-
dence. Rather, he is saying that it is possible for someone to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                              
32 Throughout we require compatibility of evidence 𝐸 with 𝑆. This is because if 𝐸 were to imply the negation of 𝑆, 
the conditional probability 𝑃(𝑆|𝐸) would be bound to be 0 by the laws of probability. Only a revision of logic might 
free one (partly) from imposing this requirement. We have, however, set this possibility aside. 
33 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” op. cit., p. 44. 
34 Ibid. 
  
Even more importantly, the weaker interpretations do justice to the point of the doctrine in Two 
Dogmas. Quine is concerned that if a statement has definite confirmation and infirmation condi-
tions, then one will be able to extract from this a doctrine of analyticity. 
[A]s long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a 
statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously con-
firmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic.35 
In order to undermine the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quine needs only to show that no 
statement is associated with a single set of confirmation or infirmation conditions. It suffices for 
this purpose that some agents may rationally take the statement as confirmed in circumstances 
where others do not take it to be confirmed. Importantly, Quine would not be required to show 
that a single agent has the option of taking the experience to confirm every statement. 
Fortunately, the other interpretations of belief-retention-come-what-may are weaker, but still 
threaten the traditional doctrine of the a priori. HOLDING-TRUE2 says that for any claim 𝑆 there 
could be a rational agent who holds that sentences to be true on any evidence whatsoever. This 
interpretation does not require any one agent to hold multiple claims true come what may. HOLD-
ING-TRUE2 is a very plausible principle given the Bayesian framework. It would obtain if for any 
non-logical claim 𝑆, it is possible that there is an agent who acquires a state of certainty in 𝑆. 
Once again, this result is outright entailed by subjective Bayesianism. But it is not ruled out by 
various forms of objective Bayesianism either. Finally, HOLDING-TRUE3 says that for any claim 
and any evidence, there is a rational agent who endorses the claim conditional on the evidence. 
Importantly, HOLDING-TRUE3 is compatible with every rational agent rejecting every claim given 
some evidence or other. But the evidence that disconfirms each claim may differ for different 
agents. 
Either of these interpretations would pose troubles for the traditional view that beliefs that can-
not be defeated by empirical evidence are a priori. According to this traditional conception, every 
claim knowable only a posteriori will be disconfirmed by some evidence 𝐸. If HOLDING-TRUE2 is 
true, then for every claim 𝑆, there is some rational agent for whom 𝑆 cannot be defeated by any 
evidence state 𝐸. It follows that some canonically a posteriori claims will be indefeasible for 
some rational agents. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 41. 
  
HOLDING-TRUE2 does conflict with some forms of Regularity, the thesis that agents should as-
sign probability 0 to only doxastically impossible propositions. Regularity is popular with some 
proponents of standard Bayesianism. However, there are standard concerns about Regularity aris-
ing from the possibility of uncountably large sample spaces: a dart with a point-sized tip hitting 
one of a real number of possible points on a dart board.36 Chalmers himself is aware of these 
challenges to Regularity.37 To accommodate this possibility, Chalmers himself is open to assign-
ing credence 0 to doxastically possible propositions. Indeed, many of his own arguments (such as 
those discussed in the section on revisability) require conditionalizing on maximally specific—
but doxastically possible—propositions that are likely to have probably 0.38 
We now turn to HOLDING-TRUE3 which avoids this complication entirely. If HOLDING-TRUE3 
is true, then there is no evidence 𝐸 that disconfirms any claim 𝑆 in itself (but only relative to 
background principles which may or may not be accepted). It follows that some canonically a 
posteriori claims are not—in principle—disconfirmed by any piece of evidence 𝐸. So HOLDING-
TRUE3 is a reasonable interpretation of Quine’s thesis that there is no such thing as evidence that 
confirms or infirms a statement simpliciter, but only relative to a theoretical background. Lastly, 
it is consistent even with Regularity, so it is consistent with a wider variety of standard Bayesian 
views. Thus, both of these weaker theses threaten the traditional doctrine of the a priori. Moreo-
ver, these interpretations do better justice to the idea that agents with different background beliefs 
may accommodate the same evidence differently. 
In light of these considerations, we can assess how to read Chalmers’s contention which is 
meant to be incompatible with belief-retention-come-what-may. Chalmers’s positive claim is 
this: 
                                                 
36 For discussion see Kenny Easwaran, “Regularity and Hyperreal Credences,” Philosophical Review, CXXIII, 1 
(2014): 1–41. 
37 Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., p. 54. 
38 There is a further complication which deserves mentioning. If the concept of conditional probability receives its 
standard ratio definition, that is, 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ≔ 𝑃(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) 𝑃(𝐴)⁄  provided 𝑃(𝐴) ≥ 0, then we can—as we have done so 
far—infer from 𝑃(𝑆) = 1 that 𝑃(𝑆|𝐸) = 1 for any evidence 𝐸 for which the conditional probability is defined. In 
other words, on the standard definition, HOLDING-TRUE2 follows from it being rationally permissible to enter into a 
state of certainty about 𝑆. The picture changes if the standard ratio definition of conditional probability is given up, 
for example in favor of Rényi-Popper functions or something similar. Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., 
p. 54, seems to consider this possibility favorably. We could then have a situation where 𝑃(𝑆) = 1 while 𝑃(𝑆|𝐸) is 
low. Although the inference from certainty would no longer go through, Rényi-Popper functions nevertheless allow 
for states of certainty in 𝑆 so that 𝑃(𝑆|𝐸) stays high for any 𝐸 compatible with 𝑆. 
  
CHALMERS PRINCIPLE: “For rational subjects and most sentences 𝑆 […], there will be evidence 
sentences 𝐸 such that 𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐸) is low.”39 
There are three quantifiers in Chalmers’s statement of his principle. This leads to the following 
interesting quantifier scope orderings. 
CHALMERS PRINCIPLE1: For any possible rational subject 𝐴, for most claims 𝑆, there is evidence 
𝐸 compatible with 𝑆 such that 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is low.
40 
CHALMERS PRINCIPLE2: For most claims 𝑆, for any possible rational subject 𝐴, there is evidence 
𝐸 compatible with 𝑆 such that 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is low. 
CHALMERS PRINCIPLE3: For most claims 𝑆, there is evidence 𝐸 compatible with 𝑆 such that for 
any possible rational subject 𝐴, 𝑐𝑟𝐴(𝑆|𝐸) is low. 
CHALMERS PRINCIPLE1 is the weakest, but most natural, reading of Chalmers’s statement. It 
says that for every agent, for most claims, there is some evidence that would disconfirm that 
claim. 
It must be admitted that Chalmers’s principle is highly plausible on this interpretation. But this 
is only a reflection of the fact that CHALMERS PRINCIPLE1 is very weak. Now, CHALMERS PRINCI-
PLE1 does do some work, since it is incompatible with the strongest interpretation of belief-
retention-come-what-may, HOLDING-TRUE1. But we have seen that this claim is implausible as 
an interpretation of the Quinean idea, which is better regimented by HOLDING-TRUE2 or HOLD-
ING-TRUE3. CHALMERS PRINCIPLE1 is compatible with these two, more plausible, interpretations 
of Quine’s thought. For HOLDING-TRUE2 requires only that for each sentence 𝑆 there could be 
some agent or other who holds 𝑆 true come what may. This is compatible with the possibility that 
every agent would reject the majority of claims under some evidence. HOLDING-TRUE3 is even 
weaker, since it is compatible with the idea that every agent would reject every claim given suita-
ble evidence, so long as the evidence is sometimes different. 
CHALMERS PRINCIPLE2 is less plausible as a reading of Chalmers’s statement, since it reverses 
the quantifier ordering in Chalmers’s formulation. Moreover, it is a stronger assertion. It says that 
for most sentences 𝑆, every rational agent will have low credence in 𝑆 given some possible evi-
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40 As the reader may note, CHALMERS PRINCIPLE as quoted above does not require 𝐸 to be compatible with 𝑆. But 
Chalmers nowhere draws on a possible incompatability between the two, so it does not seem uncharitable to 
strengthen the principle in this way. Without this strengthening, the principle would, under no interpretation, chal-
lenge the holding-true principles which contain a similar clause. 
  
dence. This is a stronger claim than CHALMERS PRINCIPLE1 since it requires that these rational 
agents find the same claims refutable. CHALMERS PRINCIPLE2 requires that for most sentences 𝑆, 
all agents agree that there is some possible evidence that would disconfirm 𝑆. But it does not re-
quire them to agree on what evidence this is. Now CHALMERS PRINCIPLE2 is incompatible with 
HOLDING-TRUE2, since the former says that for each sentence 𝑆, there could be a rational agent 
who rejects 𝑆 regardless of the evidence. But CHALMERS PRINCIPLE2 does not conflict with 
HOLDING-TRUE3, which does not require that any single agent hold 𝑆 to be true on any evidence 
𝐸, but only that given any evidence 𝐸 we can find some agent or other who holds 𝑆 to be true. 
Finally, CHALMERS PRINCIPLE3 says that for most claims 𝑆, there is some evidence 𝐸 such that 
any rational agent has a low credence in 𝑆 given 𝐸. This means that—for the majority of sentenc-
es 𝑆—every possible rational agent agrees about which evidence refutes 𝑆. CHALMERS PRINCI-
PLE3 is a very strong claim. It is sufficient to rule out even HOLDING-TRUE3, the weakest version 
of belief-retention-come-what-may, since it requires that there be some evidence which discon-
firms most sentences in isolation from their background theory. 
Neither CHALMERS PRINCIPLE2 nor CHALMERS PRINCIPLE3 are plausible as “obvious truths” 
that can undermine the Quinean position. Stated so baldly, CHALMERS PRINCIPLE3 is simply the 
negation of the claim that the same evidence may confirm or disconfirm a given statement de-
pending on the theoretical background. Moreover, it requires substantial agreement among all 
possible rational agents about what they take to justify what. One should not expect all rational 
agents—even those with very different experiences—to agree about justification relations. Re-
turning to the example of circumnavigating the Earth, agents who have experienced surprising 
symmetries on the Earth’s surface will not take an apparent circumnavigation experience to dis-
confirm the thesis that the Earth is flat, since they will expect that traveling in any one direction 
will lead to an indiscernible area. They will, therefore, not take their travels as evidence that the 
Earth is spherical. Those of us whose experience does not lead us to expect symmetries will 
therefore be surprised if, when traveling in one direction, we arrive at a location indiscernible 
from our starting point. We, therefore, take our travels as evidence that the earth is spherical. In-
sofar as CHALMERS PRINCIPLE3 requires homogeneity in responses to evidence, it is not plausible. 
It is certainly not a premise that could be used in a cogent argument against belief-retention-
come-what-may. 
  
III.  REVISABILITY: AIMS AND CONCEPTS 
Quine believes that every claim is revisable. His arguments appeal to results in the history of sci-
ence. For instance, it was once thought that the theorems of Euclidean geometry were a priori. In 
particular, it was thought to be a priori that parallel lines—defined as straight lines orthogonal to 
a common chord—would never intersect. But development in geometry showed that this claim 
was logically independent of the definition of parallel lines and other postulates of the system. 
Developments in physics went further, suggesting that this claim might have been outright false. 
The possibility of a non-Euclidean physics, then, raised doubts about the parallel postulate. 
Quine’s arguments from the history of science have been reinforced by Putnam’s examples of 
possible experiences that would lead us to revise seemingly a priori judgments such as ‘All cats 
are animals’.41 Putnam suggests that if one were discover that cats are robots made by Martians, 
then this would undermine one’s justification to believe that all cats are animals.42 
To a large extent, Chalmers’s response accepts these criticisms. The traditional examples of a 
priori truths may not be a priori. But he argues that there are still a priori truths that are indefea-
sible. Traditional advocates of the a priori simply focused on the wrong examples. Chalmers aims 
to exhibit an unnoticed class of indefeasible a priori truths. More precisely, he argues for the ex-
istence of a (non-logical) proposition 𝑝 and an a priori justification 𝐽, so that an agent who be-
lieves 𝑝 on the basis of 𝐽 cannot come to disbelieve 𝑝 on the basis of empirical evidence without 
conceptual change or irrationality. 
Chalmers argues that certain material conditionals of the form 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 are knowable a priori. 
The consequent 𝑆 of one of these conditionals is a candidate theoretical truth. Chalmers often 
picks standard examples of a posteriori necessities such as the claim that water is H2O. The ante-
cedent 𝐷 is supposed to be a maximal specification of a possible scenario, which we can think of 
as something like an epistemically possible world. The specifications will be maximal or com-
plete in that they exhaustively describe each scenario in a privileged vocabulary. Yet, the specifi-
cations will also be circumscribed in that not every truth will be in the sentence. Truths contain-
ing ordinary “natural kind” terms such as ‘water’ will not be included in the complete descrip-
                                                 
41 Hilary Putnam, “It Ain’t Necessarily So,” in Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Pa-
pers Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Hilary 
Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 
pp. 215–71. See also the discussion in Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), lecture III. 
42 In a similar vein, Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2008), chapter 4, has recently argued that full mastery of the relevant concepts is compatible with rationally denying 
even the most basic instances of logical laws. 
  
tion. 𝐷 will include what Chalmers calls core evidence: “(i) subjects’ introspective evidence […] 
and (ii) perceptual evidence about the distribution of primary and secondary qualities in the envi-
ronment.”43 It may include additional information such as Chalmers’s famous PQTI specification 
of a scenario which describes all of the facts stateable in the language of physics, phenomenal 
vocabulary, indexical facts, and a “that’s-all” clause. Roughly, the target sentence looks like this: 
(1) If the liquid stuff found in lakes and rivers (and …) has the chemical structure H2O, then wa-
ter is H2O. 
The blanks will be filled by all of the information about the world in the primitive vocabulary. 
Chalmers argues that one may initially have a high credence in such a material conditional 
arising from a high conditional credence of 𝑆 given 𝐷 and that this credence can never be low-
ered by conditionalizing on a piece of evidence 𝐸. The thought is that 𝐸 will either be incompati-
ble with 𝐷, in which case it will support the material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆, or it will be compatible 
with 𝐷, in which case it is already implied by 𝐷 (for 𝐷 is complete) and thus cannot lower the 
conditional probability of 𝑆 given 𝐷. We analyze the argument in more detail in section IV. 
To understand Chalmers’s argument, we must recast the notion of revisability in probabilistic 
terms. Say that a proposition 𝑝 is revisable in a credal state 𝑐𝑟 just in case either 𝑐𝑟(𝑝) is low 
already or it is high and there is a possible piece of evidence 𝐸 such that updating on 𝐸 would 
yield a credal state 𝑐𝑟𝐸 such that 𝑐𝑟(𝑝) is no longer high. We suggest that Quine’s slogan of uni-
versal revisability can be taken either in a stronger or a weaker sense. Call a proposition weakly 
revisable just in case it is revisable in some credal state. Call it strongly revisable just in case it is 
revisable in all credal states. If a proposition is weakly revisable, then it is not epistemically nec-
essary, for there will be a rational credal state in which it is not assigned a high credence. To the 
extent that epistemic necessity is part of the traditional conception of the a priori, universal weak 
revisability would imply that nothing is a priori. Our first task will be to show that Chalmers’s 
argument does not undermine weak revisability. Thus, Chalmers’s argument leaves a certain kind 
of revisability untouched. 
We then examine whether the Quinean can defend strong revisability. This requires rejecting 
some of the premises in Chalmers’s argument. We argue that a Quinean with Bayesian inclina-
tions has good reasons to reject the restriction on evidence Chalmers imposes. We then show that 
this restriction undermines the two most prominent Bayesian arguments that conditionalization is 
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the only rational update rule lose their force. With a restriction on evidence in place, neither the 
convergence of opinion theorems nor the dynamic Dutch book arguments can be applied to the 
relevant cases. But if those fail, there is room to consider alternative update procedures which 
would make the sample conditionals again revisable. In sum, the restriction on evidence does not 
play well with exclusiveness about conditionalization. By rejecting either, the Quinean can regain 
revisability. 
The structure of our discussion closely follows these argumentative steps. We start with an 
analysis of Chalmers’s argument. We then discuss weak revisability and strong revisability in 
turn. 
IV.  CHALMERS’S ARGUMENT 
Chalmers argues that certain complex conditionals are unrevisable.44 In this section, we examine 
the argument, which divide into two parts, A and B. 
[A] […] 𝐷 is a lengthy specification of an arbitrary scenario, and where 𝑆 is a sentence such as ‘Wa-
ter is H2O’ such that 𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐷) is high. Assuming a fully rational subject, it follows that 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐷) 
is high, so that 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) is also high. We can stipulate that 𝐷 includes or entails a full specification 
of evidence that obtains in the scenario, so that 𝐷 entails 𝐸 for any evidence sentence 𝐸 that obtains 
in the scenario and that 𝐷 entails ¬𝐸 otherwise (setting vagueness aside). [B] A quick two-case ar-
gument then suggests that no evidence 𝐸 could lead us to rationally reject 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. First case: if 𝐸 
does not obtain in the scenario, then 𝐷 entails ¬𝐸. In this case, 𝑐𝑟(¬𝐷|𝐸) = 1, so 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸) = 1. 
Second case: if 𝐸 obtains in the scenario, then 𝐷 entails 𝐸. Now 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸) must lie between 
𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸&¬𝐷) and 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸&𝐷). But the former is 1 and the latter is just 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐷), 
which we have seen is high. So 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸) is high. Putting the two cases together, 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸) is 
high for all 𝐸.45 
The argument contains a piece of purely probabilistic reasoning, but also some philosophical 
assumptions, not all of which are made explicit.46 
The probabilistic component of the argument concerns the probability of a material conditional 
in the light of evidence that is already decided by its antecedent. For any sentence 𝐴, we may 
consider the set ℰ(𝐴) ≔ {𝐵: 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 or 𝐴 ⊨ ¬𝐵} consisting of each sentence 𝐵 decided by 𝐴, 
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46 Interestingly, Timothy Williamson, “How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori 
Knowledge?,” in Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, eds., The A Priori in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
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temology is not a perfect model of epistemological holism. 
  
where 𝐴 logically decides 𝐵 just in case 𝐴 entails either 𝐵 or its negation. Focussing on sentence 
𝐷 from Chalmers’s argument, ℰ(𝐷) is the set of sentences decided by a maximal specific de-
scription of a possible world phrased in the basic vocabulary. Working with ℰ(𝐴) allows us to 
extract the piece of probability theory behind Chalmers’s argument: 
Probabilistic Fact: Let cr(𝑆|𝐷) = 𝑥. Then cr(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) ≥ 𝑥 and for all 𝐸 ∈ ℰ(𝐷): 
cr(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆|𝐸) ≥ 𝑥. 
Here 𝑆 and 𝐷 can be any sentences whatsoever and 𝑥 any value in [0,1]. What this says is simply 
that for sentences 𝐸 decided by 𝐷, conditionalizing on 𝐸 does not lower the probability of the 
material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. 
The first part of this result (cr(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) ≥ 𝑥) issues from the familiar fact that the probability of 
a material conditional is never less than the corresponding conditional probability. The central 
bits of the proof of the probabilistic fact are contained in part B of the quote above. In rough out-
line, conditionalizing on a piece of possible evidence 𝐸 decided by 𝐷 can only raise the probabil-
ity of the material conditional. If 𝐸 is incompatible with 𝐷, it makes the conditional’s antecedent 
true. And if it is implied by 𝐷, it does not affect the conditional probability of 𝑆 given 𝐷, which 
was assumed to be high. 
We have labelled this piece of probability theory a “fact” and not a “premise,” for it is a central 
part of the Bayesian framework to assume that fully rational agents satisfy the standard axioms of 
probability theory. We’ve already noted that the Bayesian framework has its limitations, some of 
which are plainly in tension with basic Quinean tenets. This applies, for instance, to the status 
assigned to logical laws, which always receive probability 1. It should be observed that if this 
assumption is relaxed, then the “probabilistic fact” might fail, too, for it heavily relies on proba-
bilistic consequences of certain entailment relations. But in the remainder of our discussion, we 
will set this way of responding to Chalmers’s argument aside. 
The probabilistic fact alone does not establish the unrevisability of the target sentence 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. 
An assumption Chalmers himself mentions (part A of the quotation above) is that 𝐷 must be 
strong enough to decide all possible evidence sentences 𝐸. Indirectly, this imposes a restriction 
on what can count as evidence. For recall that the sentence 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 is not supposed to be a logical 
truth, which would be trivially unrevisable in a Bayesian framework. But this means that 𝐷 
should not decide 𝑆, for otherwise 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 would either be a logical truth (if 𝐷 implies 𝑆) or else 
be such that the conditional probability of 𝑆 given 𝐷 would always be zero, in which case 
  
Chalmers’s argument could not get off the ground. Hence, if 𝐷 is supposed to decide all evidence 
sentences but should not decide 𝑆, the latter sentence cannot constitute a piece of possible evi-
dence. So, for the argument to work, not everything can be evidence: 
Premise 1 – Limited Evidence: Maximally consistent sets of possible evidence do not logically 
decide every proposition. In particular, they do not decide sentences like 𝑆. 
Chalmers also assumes that the conditional probability of 𝑆 given 𝐷 can be high. This is a nec-
essary assumption, for the probabilistic fact itself does not imply this. Moreover, the conditional 
probability should not only be high in virtue of some evidence, it should already be high in a ra-
tional initial credal state, for we are looking for an unrevisable truth which is a priori. Thus, a 
background assumption is this: 
Premise 2 – Weak Conditional Aprioricity: There is an initial credal state 𝑐𝑟 where 𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐷) is 
high. 
It is labelled “weak,” for it merely requires there to be a credal state with the desired property. 
It does not say that all credal states have this property. 
Finally, the probabilistic fact tells us only that conditional on any piece of evidence, the cre-
dence in 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 will be high. In order to infer from this that we cannot rationally update so that 
this credence gets low, we have to assume that the only rational update rule is conditionalization: 
Premise 3 – Exclusiveness: Conditionalization is the only rational update rule. 
With the three premises in place, we can now reconstruct Chalmers’s argument. By the re-
striction on evidence, we can choose a 𝐷 which decides all possible evidence without deciding 𝑆. 
Given the second premise, there is an initial credal state in which the conditional credence 
𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐷) is high. The probabilistic fact entails that the credence in 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 is high and cannot be 
lowered by conditionalizing on any statement decided by 𝐷. Finally, exclusiveness rules out any 
other way of rationally lowering our credence in the target conditional. Thus, we would find: 
Unrevisability: For some 𝑆 and 𝐷, there is an initial credal state 𝑐𝑟 such that 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) is high 
in virtue of 𝑐𝑟(𝑆|𝐷) being high and no such credal state can be rationally updated by evidence 𝐸 
to result in a credal state 𝑐𝑟𝐸 in which 𝑐𝑟𝐸(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) is not high. 
The argument poses a clear threat to the popular Quinean claim that every statement is revisa-
ble. We now investigate two avenues of resistance. 
  
V.  WEAK REVISABILITY 
Chalmers’s argument, if sound, establishes that there is an initial credal state in which the proba-
bility of the conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 is high and cannot be lowered by updating on any piece of evi-
dence. In this section, we explain that the argument leaves open the possibility that the condition-
al is revisable in some credal states, which is to say that it is compatible with the weak revisabil-
ity of the target conditional. 
Premise 2, Weak Conditional Aprioricity, says that there is an initial credal state in which the 
conditional probability of 𝑆 given 𝐷 is high. Given that 𝐷 does not logically imply 𝑆, there is 
nothing probabilistically incoherent about the conditional probability of 𝑆 given 𝐷 being low in 
some other rational epistemic states. That the conditional probability should be low for some ep-
istemic subjects is independently plausible, particularly if one adopts a broadly Quinean outlook. 
Someone who doubts that water is H2O in this world will typically not adopt this attitude because 
she has doubts about the distribution of seas, lakes, and rivers on the one hand and the location of 
H2O molecules on the other. The reason to doubt that water is H2O will rather pertain to her gen-
eral background beliefs, as suggested by Quinean holism about justification. For instance, she 
may think that ‘water’ expresses a vague concept and ‘H2O’ a precise one, perhaps because she 
thinks that the former concept is defined only in terms of family resemblance whereas the latter 
has a clear-cut chemical definition. Or, she may think that water is essentially an impure sub-
stance, whereas H2O is a pure one. These considerations may lead her to doubt that water is H2O. 
They may ultimately be wrong, but they do not seem to be irrational. 
Now, starting out with a low conditional credence does not mean that one starts out with a low 
credence in the material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. Although a high conditional probability is sufficient 
for a high probability of the conditional, it is not necessary. Hence, a low conditional probability 
is compatible with a high probability of the conditional. In our case, a predicament of this kind is 
particularly plausible. The reason is that 𝐷 is a very strong proposition which is true only at one 
world or a small number of qualitatively indiscernible worlds. Given this modal profile, it is ini-
tially quite unlikely that 𝐷 will turn out to be true. But if 𝐷 is unlikely, it is likely that the condi-
tional has a false antecedent, which would make it true. So, initially, the conditional would be 
probably true. 
However, given that the conditional probability is low, the conditional is revisable. Updating 
on 𝐷 will result in a low credence in 𝑆. But under these conditions the probability of the material 
conditional just is the probability of its consequent 𝑆 (if 𝑃(𝐷) = 1, 𝑃(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) = 𝑃(𝑆)) and so the 
  
conditional will have been revised: its credence has gone from high to low. This shows that the 
target sentences Chalmers considers are still revisable in the weak sense of there being some 
credal states in which they are revised. If this is so, there are no necessary connections—even 
assuming fully rational agents—between the grasp of certain concepts and the acceptance of cer-
tain propositions. For all the argument shows, no proposition would be epistemically necessary. 
This already goes a certain way towards the Quinean rejection of immunity from revision. 
That Chalmers’s argument is compatible with a form of revisability can be traced back to the 
fact that it only assumes the weak aprioricity of the relevant conditional probability. If this prem-
ise were strengthened to strong aprioricity, that is, if it were assumed that the conditional proba-
bility must be high in all rational credal states, then a strong form of unrevisability would follow. 
The material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 would then have to be assigned a high credence in all rational 
credal states. 
To guard against the worry that this stronger premise might hold, we should take a look at how 
Chalmers justifies the second premise in order to be sure that the line of argument he uses does 
not warrant a stronger conclusion. He does not give an explicit justification of the second premise 
in the chapter on Quine or in the accompanying paper, but he develops an elaborate set of argu-
ments in other parts of the book (see particularly chapter 4.3) to show that conditionals of the 
type 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 can be known a priori. These are the so-called frontloading arguments. The idea be-
hind the frontloading arguments can be seen as an epistemic variant of conditional proof. If tak-
ing a sentence 𝐷 as a premise allows one to prove 𝑆, this can be turned into a proof of the condi-
tional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 which no longer depends on the premise 𝐷. Similarly, if we are justified in believ-
ing 𝑆 after having acquired the body of evidence 𝐷, we are justified in believing 𝑆 conditional on 
𝐷, where this justification does no longer depend on 𝐷. Now, if 𝐷 was our total body of empiri-
cal evidence, then our justification of 𝑆 given 𝐷 is independent of experience, hence a priori. Alt-
hough engaging with the frontloading arguments is beyond the scope of this paper,47 it suffices 
for our purposes to note that these arguments would only show that it is possible to obtain a priori 
justification for a conditional of the form 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 on the assumption that it is possible to be justi-
fied in believing 𝑆 based on evidence 𝐷. In credal terms, they would show only that assigning a 
high initial conditional credence to 𝑆 given 𝐷 is possible, not that it is necessary. As a matter of 
                                                 
47 See the exchange in David J. Chalmers, “Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter and Stan-
ley,” Analysis, LXXIV, 4 (October 2014): 676–97; Ram Neta, “Chalmers’s Frontloading Argument for A Priori Scru-
tability,” Analysis, LXXIV, 4 (October 2014): 651–61; and Laura Schroeter, “Scrutability and Epistemic Updating: 
Comments on Chalmers’s Constructing the World,” Analysis, LXXIV, 4 (October 2014): 638–51. 
  
fact, if we start with a subject who rationally denies 𝑆 despite possessing evidence 𝐷, which we 
have argued is possible, the machinery of the argument can be employed to show that it is ration-
ally permissible to assign a low conditional probability to 𝑆 given 𝐷. A Quinean might want to 
take issue with the frontloading arguments for independent reasons, but they do not pose an im-
mediate threat to the claim that weak revisability is compatible with Chalmers’s argument. 
VI.  STRONG REVISABILITY 
We have seen so far that a high credence in 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 is not rationally mandatory. Agents with a 
different set of background beliefs may come to assign a low probability to this conditional, for 
they do not take 𝐷 to justify 𝑆. This is an instance of holism about justification: any particular 
evidential relation may be defeated by having an undermining background belief. The question 
we would now like to address is whether this thought generalizes even further. Can the Quinean 
go beyond weak revisability? 
Strong revisability requires that the target conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 be revisable even in credal states 
which assign a high conditional credence to 𝑆 given 𝐷. Let us briefly recap where we stand in the 
dialectic. 
 We grant that it is possible for a rational agent to have a high prior credence in 𝑆 given 𝐷 
and that, as a consequence, the rational agent may have a high prior credence in 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. 
 We grant the probabilistic fact that updating by conditionalizing on a statement decided 
by 𝐷 will not lower one’s credence in 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆. 
 Therefore, if 𝑐𝑟(𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) can only be lowered, then one must either: 
(a) rationally update on a statement not decided by 𝐷, or 
(b) apply some update rule other than conditionalization. 
On our preferred view, it is possible to update by conditionalization on a statement outside of 
the privileged vocabulary used in stating 𝐷. This means that we deny Chalmers’s restriction on 
what counts as possible evidence. We believe that it is possible—in the sense relevant to a claim 
being revisable—to update on a statement outside of what Chalmers calls core evidence or what-
ever statements comprise the restricted class of evidence statements. 
We briefly sketch a Quinean position that does not presuppose any restriction on evidence. 
This Quinean position, therefore, is not susceptible to Chalmers’s argument. We then show that 
restrictions on evidence and exclusiveness about conditionalization do not play well together. In 
particular, the standard arguments for exclusiveness about conditionalization presuppose a broad 
  
conception of evidence. This dependence poses a kind of dilemma. If Chalmers insists that evi-
dence is limited in principle, then he cannot deploy the standard arguments for the Bayesian as-
sumption that conditionalization is the only rational update rule. So one of the crucial premises 
will be unsupported. Either view will provide a route for the Quinean to escape Chalmers’s ar-
guments. 
VI.1. Broad Evidence. We reject Chalmers’s restriction on possible evidence. This position 
may at first seem problematic and may perhaps even appear in tension with the position which 
we wish to defend. Namely, Quine himself is an empiricist. He believes that our evidence is lim-
ited to a privileged class of observation sentences. Though his characterization evolves through-
out his career, the central features are that observation sentences are more responsive to immedi-
ate environmental promptings and that the community will tend to issue the same judgments giv-
en similar promptings.48 These statements comprise the “periphery” of our theory in that they are 
the ultimate evidence for all of our knowledge.49 Do these commitments conflict with our claim 
that it is possible—in the relevant sense—to acquire a non-observation sentence as evidence? 
The tension is merely apparent. Quine’s observation sentences are meant to include the state-
ments that have been and will be the total evidence for our scientific theory. That is, Quine’s em-
piricist theorizes, among other things, about the evidence for her own theory. She conjectures, on 
the basis of her current evidence, that her evidence will be limited to certain kinds of sensory 
inputs and expressed by the narrow range observation sentences. Put in probabilistic terms, 
Quine’s empiricist assigns a very low credence to the claim that she will have evidence outside of 
the privileged class. But the important point is that “[i]t was science itself […] that demonstrated 
the limitedness of the evidence for science.”50 That is, the restriction on evidence is not an a pri-
ori restriction on what evidence is possible, but only a restriction on the kinds of evidence we, in 
our current state, will acquire. This implies that even though one’s credence that one’s evidence 
will be limited is fairly certain, it is still revisable. As Quine says: 
Even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options, however moribund. It would take some ex-
traordinary evidence to enliven them, but, if that were to happen, then empiricism itself—the crown-
ing norm, we saw, of naturalized epistemology—would go by the board. For remember that that 
                                                 
48 These definitions all tend to expand on the characterization of a sentence being “germane” to experience dis-
cussed in Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” op. cit., pp. 43–44. See the accounts in W. V. O. Quine, Word and 
Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), §10; and in Quine, Pursuit of Truth, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
49 For instance, Quine, Pursuit of Truth, op. cit., says: “The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the 
prediction that checks a theory” (p. 4) and “Observation sentences are thus the vehicle of scientific evidence” (p. 5). 
50 W. V. O. Quine, The Roots of Reference (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1973), p. 3. 
  
norm, and naturalized epistemology itself, are integral to science, and science is malleable and corri-
gible. […] The collapse of empiricism would admit extra input by telepathy or revelation, but the test 
of the resulting science would still be predicted sensation.51 
In the example, Quine mentions telepathy and clairvoyance as options for departing from his 
view of observation sentences. But more serious view are also available. For instance, Siegel52 
offers an account according to which perception provides a very rich content and Maddy53—
developing a broadly Quinean position—even suggests that we may have direct observational 
evidence for mathematical entities. Williamson’s view that evidence includes all knowledge also 
deserves mention.54 The point isn’t that these views of the range of evidence are true. Rather, it’s 
that the evidence against them leaves room for revision even of our range of evidence sentences. 
Given that Quine’s empiricist believes the constraints on evidence are themselves revisable, she 
cannot endorse these constraints with credence 1. Otherwise, there would be no straightforward 
way to update through simple conditionalization.55 Thus, it is in principle possible that we ac-
quire evidence outside of the privileged class. 
Our position relies on the claim that the range of potential evidence is broader than the range of 
likely evidence and that Quine’s empiricism consists in the fact that he thinks that all of our like-
ly—though not all possible—evidence is sensory. But in what sense is it possible that one ac-
quires evidence outside of the privileged class? In what sense is it possible that one accesses the 
broader range of evidential claims through telepathy, say, or the kinds of evidence described by 
Maddy, Siegel, or Williamson? A natural first response is that it is metaphysically possible. It is 
metaphysically possible that we acquire different perceptual faculties. But, of course, it might 
turn out that the range of metaphysical possibility is surreptitiously restricted so that human be-
ings like us simply cannot acquire such perceptual faculties. If this is the case, then we follow 
Chalmers in making certain idealizing assumptions so that the range of evidence is not held “hos-
tage” to these facts about metaphysical possibility.56 It may well be that it is metaphysically im-
possible for a rational agent to update on (or even entertain) all of the evidence sentences decided 
by 𝐷. But for Chalmers, this would not threaten his claims that the conditionals 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 are know-
                                                 
51 Quine, Pursuit of Truth, op. cit., pp. 20–21. 
52 Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
53 Penelope Maddy, Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
54 Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, op. cit. 
55 That is, without allowing us to update on statements with 0 credence. 
56 Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., §2.7. The quote is from p. 64. 
  
able a priori. A similar move should be available to the Quinean, if it turns out to be metaphysi-
cally impossible to update on certain claims outside of the privileged class. 
At this point, it is important to reiterate and clarify a concession we made in section I. In order 
to fit Quine’s position into the Bayesian framework, we conceded that when an agent acquires 
evidence 𝑆, then the agent’s credence in 𝑆 is set to 1. So—following standard Bayesianism—the 
effect of a subject 𝐴 acquiring the evidence that there is a triangle before her is that 𝐴’s credence 
that there is a triangle before her is 1 and its negation is set to 0. Since credence 1 and credence 0 
are persistent in Bayesian frameworks, one cannot hold true that it is not the case that there is a 
triangle if one has already updated on the claim that there is a triangle. Similarly, one cannot re-
vise the claim that there is a triangle if it has already been acquired as evidence. As a result, some 
care was required in formulating Quine’s doctrines of holding-true and of revisability to fit them 
into the Bayesian framework. The doctrine of holding-true was formulated so that any statement 
𝑆 can be held true upon acquiring evidence consistent with 𝑆.57 Similarly, the doctrine of revisa-
bility requires any sentence 𝑆 may be revised, so long as we have not updated on claims logically 
entailing 𝑆. 
Since we hold that a broader range of claims are potential evidence, this means that—for a 
broader range of claims—if an agent actually acquires the evidence entailing ¬𝑆, then 𝑆 cannot 
be held true in this very epistemic state. Similarly, if an agent acquires evidence entailing 𝑆, then 
𝑆 cannot be revised. Although we recognize that excepting evidence statements in this way 
makes the representation of Quine’s doctrine in the Bayesian framework less than perfect, we do 
not think the expansion of the range of possible evidence raises any new complications. The con-
ception of evidence we have sketched in this section merely requires that for a broader range of 
(contingent) sentences 𝑆, there is a possible world in which it is (or can rationally be treated as) 
evidence. This does not mean that the sentence 𝑆 (or its negation) actually is evidence. Indeed, in 
our own view, it is unlikely that one will acquire such evidence. 
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VI.2. Narrow Evidence. We believe that the Quinean should defend a broad conception of evi-
dence. A more conservative move would be to stick to a narrow description of evidence, but al-
low for non-inferential learning. The Quinean could argue that belief change doesn’t always have 
to go by way of acquiring new evidence. Sometimes a claim can be learned without it being a 
new piece of evidence. Suppose that a subject starts her epistemic life with a high conditional 
credence in 𝑆 given 𝐷. Thus, her credence in the material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 will be high and the 
only way it could be lowered would be for her to change the corresponding conditional credence. 
What might trigger such a change? As we observed earlier, a high conditional credence could be 
defeated by developing certain background beliefs which undermine the evidential import 𝐷 is 
taken to have on 𝑆. Again, this is in line with Quine’s idea of evidential holism according to 
which evidential relations either already depend on certain background beliefs or can be under-
mined by adopting further background beliefs. In the case at hand, our subject may come to real-
ize that her theory of mass term identities would fit much better with her other views if she gave 
up that identity. As in our previous discussion, she may come to think that ‘water’ expresses a 
concept based on family resemblance, while ‘H2O’ does not.58 She would produce an argument 
mostly based on thought, possibly combined with general lessons she has drawn from experience. 
One way to analyze such a scenario would be to say that our subject has learned that water is not 
H2O. In doing so, she should conditionalize on the information she has learned and this overrides 
the high conditional probability that water is H2O given 𝐷. The learning episode might consist in 
claims like ‘Water is an impure substance’ or ‘The concept of water has application conditions 
defined in terms of family resemblance’ and general theories backing up such claims. It may also 
include considerations about theoretical virtues relevant for best system type considerations. If 
the subject updates on such sentences by conditionalization, her conditional credence in 𝑆 given 
𝐷 might go down, for 𝐷 will then no longer appear to be evidence for 𝑆. 
The possibility of this sort of move depends on whether there can be learning episodes that are 
not grounded in evidence. Notice that one peculiar feature about the learning episodes is that they 
work by conditionalizing on what has been learned. So, the possibility of non-evidential learning 
does not conflict with exclusiveness or pose a problem for the view that conditionalization is the 
only rational response to learned information. Nonetheless, one might be uncomfortable allowing 
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for this sort of non-evidential learning. Indeed, one might suggest that the Bayesian should ana-
lyze any case of rational updating by conditionalization in terms of evidence on which one condi-
tionalizes. This sort of account would rule out by non-evidential learning almost by definition. 
If one imposes a restriction on evidence and identifies evidential learning with learning tout 
court, then the proponent of revisability is left with only one option. She must challenge exclu-
siveness, the claim that conditionalization is the only rational update rule. One might object to 
this move by citing the standard arguments for Bayesianism. For instance, Chalmers objects that 
it would require “[…] at least a revision of orthodox Bayesianism.”59 We find at least two stand-
ard arguments for (orthodox) Bayesianism compelling. 
Convergence Arguments: There is no need to appeal to an update rule other than conditionaliza-
tion, since distinct credal states (satisfying certain minimal constraints) will converge if they re-
peatedly conditionalize on evidence. 
Dutch Book Arguments: Violating conditionalization leads subjects to evaluate bets as favorable 
even though they guarantee a loss. 
But we suggest that these arguments do not work in the present dialectical context. In particu-
lar, in the context of a restriction on what can be learned, these arguments lose their force. That 
is, these arguments exhibit an interesting dependence of this fact on a broad conception of evi-
dence or on the possibility of non-evidential learning of broad truths. 
                                                 
59 Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., p. 223. In addition, Chalmers points (a) to logical (and perhaps 
mathematical) beliefs which are bound to be assigned probability 1 by any probability function and (b) to the possi-
bility that one might be able to redefine analyticity in terms of those sentences which cannot be revised by condition-
alization without conceptual change (ibid., pp. 222–23). Regarding (a), note that we granted that the status of logical 
truths in Bayesianism might not sit well with Quinean tenets (and is independently controversial). Regarding (b), our 
concern here is not to argue against the possibility of defining analyticity in epistemic terms somehow or other, but 
rather with the epistemological question whether any sentence can be rationally revised without conceptual change. 
  
VI.2.a. Merger of Opinion Results. Convergence of opinion theorems show, within limits, that 
if two subjects start their epistemic lives with two not radically different initial probability distri-
butions, their credences in a given hypothesis will converge over the long run through continuous 
updates by conditionalization. A possible difference in prior probabilities gets “washed out” in 
the course of learning more and more shared facts. Although the epistemological impact of these 
theorems is controversial, they are very suggestive. In particular, in the light of such convergence 
theorems, a revision of prior probabilities does not seem necessary, for the same effect can be 
achieved through continuous updates by conditionalization. 
One of the strongest and most influential merger of opinion theorem is the one due to Gaifman 
and Snir.60 To get a feel for the theorem, two concepts are worth explicating. To begin with, two 
probability functions 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are said to be equally dogmatic iff they assign 1 and 0 to the 
same sentences. It is clear that being equally dogmatic is a necessary condition for any conver-
gence of opinions result. This is because 1’s and 0’s cannot be undone by conditionalization and 
so if two agents start out giving the same hypothesis opposite probabilities of 1 and 0, their opin-
ions will never converge if they update only by conditionalization. A second crucial notion is that 
of a separating set of sentences. The idea behind separation is that an increasing sequence of evi-
dence might be informative enough to distinguish between any pair of worlds 𝑤1 and 𝑤2. It is 
similarly clear that something like seperation is necessary for convergence of opinion: if two 
agents are given only a limited amount of evidence over the course of their epistemic lives, they 
could still disagree about matters which remain uninformed by the evidence. With these two no-
tions in place, the theorem by Gaifman and Snir says: If 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are two equally dogmatic 
probability functions which are subsequently conditionalized on a seperating sequence of evi-
dence, then differences in probability assignment converge to 0 for almost all sentences. (‘Al-
most all’ here means except for a set of worlds which has probability 0 by the lights of 𝑃1 and 
𝑃2.) 
The crucial point with respect to Chalmers’s argument is that the theorem applies only if the 
accumulated evidence ultimately separates all worlds. If there is a restriction on what counts as 
evidence, the theorem no longer establishes convergence of opinions for more theoretical hypoth-
eses. In their discussion of the theorem, Gaifman and Snir assumed that the language only con-
                                                 
60 Haim Gaifman and Marc Snir, “Probabilities over Rich Languages, Testing and Randomness,” Journal of Sym-
bolic Logic, XLVII, 3 (September 1982): 495–548, at p. 14. For discussion, see, for example, John Earman, Bayes or 
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tains empirical predicates and thus the set of truth-functional compounds of atomic sentences 
could be assumed to be separating. But when the language contains in addition expressions for 
more theoretical concepts, this may no longer hold. Either one has to grant that they may enter as 
evidence or the convergence of opinion theorems only establish a washing-out of priors over a 
more narrow range of “empirical hypotheses.”61 
As a matter of fact, there will be no convergence of opinions regarding the sentences 𝐷 and 𝑆 
which are relevant for our discussion. To see this, suppose a subject 𝑠1 starts out with a high con-
ditional probability in 𝑆 given 𝐷, whereas a subject 𝑠2 begins her epistemic life with a low condi-
tional probability. Their credence functions can then still be assumed to be equally dogmatic. 
Suppose further that they gradually acquire more and more evidence implied by 𝐷 until they ul-
timately have learned 𝐷. Then 𝑠1’s credence in 𝑆 (and in the material conditional 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆) will 
converge to a high value because it will equal the prior conditional probability in 𝑆 given 𝐷, 
which we assumed to be high. On the other hand, 𝑠2’s credence will converge to a low one, by 
the same argument. Since Chalmers’s restriction on evidence prohibits further sentences not de-
cided by 𝐷 as possible updates, the credences of the two subjects in the material conditional 𝐷 ⊃
𝑆 will never converge. 
Thus, one of the prime reasons that standard Bayesian epistemology proceeds without changes 
in initial probabilities cannot be invoked for the type of examples Chalmers has in mind. Conse-
quently, if the restriction on evidence is adopted, one gains reason to allow revisions of prior 
probabilities concerning such examples. The package of the two assumptions—a narrow concep-
tion of evidence and exclusiveness about conditionalization—is far less plausible than it may 
have initially appeared to be. 
                                                 
61 Cf. Earman, Bayes or Bust?, op. cit., pp. 150–52. 
  
VI.2.b. Dynamic Dutch Books. The Quinean faces a second class of arguments if she accepts a 
narrow conception of evidence but still aims at strong revisability: the dynamic Dutch book ar-
guments. Where the convergence of opinion theorems can be interpreted as showing that a revi-
sion of priors is unnecessary, the dynamic Dutch book arguments are usually seen as indicating 
that failures of conditionalization manifest a certain kind of pragmatic inconsistency. In rough 
outline, the dynamic Dutch book theorem says:  if an agent 𝑎 at 𝑡1 is prepared to update her cre-
dences for some proposition 𝐴 and some possible evidence 𝐸 in a way which would violate con-
ditionalization, for instance by setting 𝑐𝑟𝑡2(𝐴) < 𝑐𝑟𝑡1(𝐴|𝐸) if she learns 𝐸 in the interval from 𝑡1 
to 𝑡2, then she is forced to accept a number of bets at 𝑡1 and possibly another bet at 𝑡2 which will 
jointly ensure a net loss for her no matter how the world turns out to be.62 In other words, our 
agent will be exploitable by a clever bookie who knows about her deviant update behavior. 
Chalmers takes the dynamic Dutch book arguments to preclude the possibility that a Quinean 
may allow for alternative ways of updating credences.63 
Debates continue about the epistemological impact of the original Dutch book arguments and 
their dynamic extensions.64 There are various reasons for being skeptical about a direct link be-
tween rationality, potential betting behavior and the exploitability by a clever bookie. On the oth-
er hand, many participants in the debate seem to believe that for some way of settling the intricate 
philosophical issues in the background of the Dutch book arguments, there is an important lesson 
to be learned from these arguments. As a proper evaluation of all the relevant issues is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we shall restrict our attention to those which are in direct contact with the 
potential unrevisability of Chalmers’s target conditionals. 
Crucially, the bets which would have to be made in order to Dutch book an agent changing her 
credence in 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 by changing her conditional probability in 𝑆 given 𝐷 would have a very pecu-
liar feature. The set of bets made against the targeted agent will include a bet on 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 (and bets 
on propositions in which 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 features as a constituent). By assuming a narrow conception of 
evidence, 𝑆 was chosen in such way that it is not decided by 𝐷, which in turn decides all possible 
evidence. If 𝐷 turns out to be false, then a bet on 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 can easily be settled. But suppose 𝐷 is 
true. First of all, given that 𝐷 comprises all possible evidence, its truth can probably only be rec-
                                                 
62 The theorem is due to Lewis, first reported in Paul Teller, “Conditionalization and Observation,” Synthese, 
XXVI, 2 (December 1973): 218–58. 
63 Chalmers, Constructing the World, op. cit., p. 166. 
64 See, for example, the recent exchange between Rachael Briggs, “Distorted Reflection,” Philosophical Review, 
CXVIII, 1 (January 2009): 59–85; and Anna Mahtani, “Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments,” Philosophical Review, 
CXXI, 3 (July 2012): 443–50. 
  
ognized at the very last moment of time (if such exists). Secondly, in order to decide whether 
𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 is true, one would have to decide 𝑆. But given that 𝐷 does not imply 𝑆 while still implying 
all the available evidence, 𝑆 will not be decided by the evidence. So, in a sense, the truth or falsi-
ty of 𝑆 cannot be conclusively settled. As a consequence, a bet on 𝐷 ⊃ 𝑆 cannot be settled if 𝐷 
happens to be true. In such a case, the agent and the bookie may reasonably disagree about who 
won the relevant bet or, what is more likely, they may both remain somewhat uncertain about 
whether 𝑆 is true or not by assigning a credence strictly between 0 and 1 to 𝑆 conditional on the 
available evidence. If the agent and bookie have an antecedent agreement for “settling up” on 
bets that have not been resolved, then, of course, the bookie still may be able to make money off 
of the agent. For instance, if the agent and bookie agree that the truth of 𝑆 will be resolved for the 
purposes of the bet by whether the agent has high anterior or posterior credence in 𝑆 given 𝐷, 
then perhaps the bookie can lead the agent to irrational bets. But different settling up mechanisms 
will lead to different bets being rational. As a result, on either such a scheme, the rationality of 
betting on 𝑆 given 𝐷 seems to detach from the likelihood that 𝑆 is true on the assumption that 𝐷. 
In sum, owing to its highly theoretical nature, we are dealing with a sentence bets on which do 
not have fully determinate conditions under which they would count as being settled. As a conse-
quence, it seems that the pragmatic versions of the Dutch book arguments are inapplicable.65 
But is there any theoretical explanation for why a rational agent might change her priors? One 
possibility is that revision of priors may bring the agent closer to the truth. That is, it may be that 
changing from a low to a high credence in 𝑆 given 𝐷 leads to more true and fewer false beliefs. 
On this view, while it may be rational to begin inquiry with a high conditional credence, one will 
be missing out on some truths (namely, 𝑆) if one does not revise this conditional probability at 
some point during inquiry. This revision might be motivated by theoretical considerations of the 
sort considered above such as simplicity, parsimony, and so forth.66 More importantly, we know 
from the failure of the convergence of opinions theorem for the cases Chalmers is interested in 
that it may be the only way of getting closer to the truth. If we did not already start out with as-
                                                 
65 A further problem is worth mentioning. It has been observed by Bas C. van Fraassen (in Laws and Symmetry 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapters 7 and 13, particularly p. 174) that a dynamic Dutch book can only 
be made against an agent if she uses an alternative update rule recommending a different response to the evidence 
than conditionalization would have it (if no such rule is known to the bookie, she would not know whether to buy or 
sell the relevant bets). But the envisaged changes of priors do not constitute alternative ways of responding to evi-
dence, for they are concerned with non-evidential learning. 
66 Similarly, Igor Douven (in “Inference to the Best Explanation, Dutch Books, and Inaccuracy Minimisation,” 
The Philosophical Quarterly, LXIII, 252 (July 2013): 428–44) argues that non-vulnerability to dynamic Dutch books 
might just be one out of many legitimate and occasionally competing goals. According to Douven, non-vulnerability 
to a Dutch book can be outweighed by faster convergence to the true hypothesis, for example. 
  
signing the true hypothesis a high probability conditional on the body of evidence narrowly con-
strued, we cannot arrive at a high credence for the true hypothesis by changing our beliefs only 
through conditionalization. Someone who begins with low credence in 𝑆 given 𝐷 will not be in a 
position to find out that 𝑆 is true unless she revises her priors. How can a kind of belief change be 
irrational if it is the only way of getting closer to the truth? 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
According to Quine, every claim can be held true come what may and every claim can be revised. 
Chalmers alleges that these two hypotheses are incompatible with a Bayesian theory of rational 
belief change. More specifically, he holds that both theses result in widespread violations of con-
ditionalization. Chalmers’s criticism of the thesis that any claim may be held-true requires the 
Quinean to be more explicit about the logical structure of her own position. Specifically, the key 
issue is that a possibility claim quantifying separately over possible agents, evidence and a target 
proposition. Changing the order of quantifiers leads to different versions of holding-true thesis. 
The only one which conflicts with Bayesianism is too obviously implausible to capturing what 
Quine had in mind. The remaining two claims, however, are consistent with Bayesianism and still 
pose a threat to epistemically demanding conceptions of analyticity or the a priori. 
Universal revisability is also a mere possibility claim. This allows one to see that Chalmers’s 
counterargument is compatible with a weak version of revisability: to any claim there is a rational 
epistemic state in which it can be revised. Moreover, it exposes a connection with Quine’s 
thoughts about evidence. Perhaps surprisingly, Quine has a broad conception of evidence accord-
ing to which everything can possibly be evidence, even though contemporary science suggests 
that the range of evidence in this world is more narrowly circumscribed. Finally, if one neverthe-
less countenances a narrow conception of evidence, it turns out that the standard arguments for 
the exclusiveness of conditionalization no longer stand. In either case, Quinean epistemology 
escapes unscathed. 
 
 
 
